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Abstract—Enabling coordination between products from dif-
ferent vendors is a key characteristic of the design philosophy
behind future wireless communication networks. As an example,
different devices may have different implementations, leading to
different user experiences. A similar story emerges when devices
running different physical and link layer protocols share frequen-
cies in the same spectrum in order to maximize the system-wide
spectral efficiency. In such situations, coordinating multiple inter-
fering devices presents a significant challenge not only from an in-
terworking perspective (as a result of reduced infrastructure), but
also from an implementation point of view. The following question
may then naturally arise: How to accommodate integrating such
heterogeneous wireless devices seamlessly? One approach is to
coordinate the spectrum in a centralized manner. However, the
desired autonomous feature of future wireless systems makes
the use of a central authority for spectrum management less
appealing. Alternately, intelligent spectrum coordination have
spurred great interest and excitement in the recent years. This
paper presents a multi-level (hierarchical) power control game
where users jointly choose their channel control and power
control selfishly in order to maximize their individual energy
efficiency. By hierarchical, we mean that some users’ decision
priority is higher/lower than the others. We propose two simple
and nearly-optimal algorithms that ensure complete spectrum
coordination among users. Interestingly, it turns out that the
complexity of the two proposed algorithms is, in the worst case,
quadratic in the number of users, whereas the complexity of
the optimal solution (obtained through exhaustive search) is
N !. These results offer hope that such simple and accurate
power control algorithms can be designed around competition,
as hierarchical behavior does not only improve the mechanism’s
performance but also leads to simpler distributed power control
algorithms.
Index Terms—Spectrum coordination, multi-carrier networks,
multi-level system, energy efficiency, power control game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Operators are facing exponential traffic increase in their
newly deployed networks, which is becoming a challenge in
terms of investments and energy consumption [1], [2]. Since
2010, under the GreenTouch consortium initiative [3], cellular
network actors have identified different solutions and scenarios
of future networks that could sustain the expected traffic
huge demand while maintaining a good quality of service
(QoS) and reducing environmental impact. As an example, the
ambitious mission of the GreenTouch consortium initiative is
to deliver the architecture, specifications and roadmap in order
to increase total network energy efficiency by a factor of 1000
compared to 2010 levels [3]. Whether these solutions are based
on optimizing the macro layer, using new frequency bands or
introducing small cells, they all require a careful study in terms
of energy consumption impact and operational costs.
In future networks such as heterogeneous networks,
interference management is a crucial issue since the
interference due to spectrum sharing can significantly degrade
the overall performance [4]. In the existing works, various
resource allocation methods are proposed to either improve
energy efficiency or alleviate interference. However, very little
research has addressed their joint interaction. Furthermore,
most existing works are throughput-based-utility problems
which lead to a water-filling power control [5] where only
a certain number of carriers are exploited depending on the
channel gains. In particular, when the signal-to-noise plus
interference ratio (SINR) is low (resp. high), only one (resp.
every) carrier is exploited. Energy efficiency, on the other
hand, is always maximized by using a single carrier [6]. This
means that an energy efficient transmitter (e.g., a primary
user) always leaves K − 1 bands completely vacant for other
users (e.g., secondary users) with K being the total number
of carriers. This makes the coordination feature across the
multiple interfering devices particularly appealing, not only
from an interworking perspective (as a result of reduced
infrastructure), but also for improving both network coverage
and capacity without the need to split the available spectrum.
As an example, in heterogeneous networks, the coordination
between macro cells and small cells can increase capacity
in the order of 2 to 10 times through spectrum reuse across
layers and radio coordination functionality [7]. The practical
performance of spectrum coordination is, however, limited
by a variety of nonidealities, such as insufficient channel
knowledge, high computational complexity, heterogeneous
user conditions, transceiver impairments, and the constrained
level of coordination between users.
One major motivation of this paper is to study fully coordi-
nated energy efficient models which can be easily implemented
in practice. A key technical mechanism of multi-user resource
allocation is that of power control, which serves as a mean
for both battery saving and interference management. We shall
address a multi-level (hierarchical) power control game where
transmitters choose their control policy selfishly in order to
maximize their individual energy efficiency. We shall further
ar
X
iv
:1
50
2.
01
15
7v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 4 
Fe
b 2
01
5
Original model New model
. . . 
One leader
One follower
Super leader
Last follower
1
2
N
First follower
1
2
Fig. 1. The original model in [18] and the new model.
model the system as a decentralized multiple access scheme
in the sense that the receiver does not dictate to the users their
transmit power levels. Hence, each user can choose freely
his power control policy in order to selfishly maximize his
individual performance criterion, called utility (or payoff) in
the context of game theoretic studies.
RELATED WORK
There have been many works on hierarchical (Stackelberg)
games, even in the context of cognitive radio [8], but they
do not consider energy efficiency for the individual utility as
defined in [6], [9], [10]. They rather consider transmission
rate-type utilities (see e.g., [11], [12] for water-filling games,
[13] for pricing models, [14] for coalition formation games).
Hierarchical games are in fact a mechanism for wireless net-
works in which some wireless nodes (leaders) have the priority
to access the medium, whereas other users (followers) have a
low priority to transmit. In the literature, energy efficient power
control game has been first proposed by Goodman et al. in
[9] for flat fading channels and re-used by [6] and [15] for
multi-carrier code-division multiple access (CDMA) systems,
[16] for relay-assisted DS/CDMA and [17] for orthogonal
frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) communication
systems. All these works did not consider hierarchy among
different actors in the system.
In [19], authors studied a hierarchical game theoretic model
for two-user two-carrier energy efficient wireless systems. The
power control problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game
where transmitters choose their control policy selfishly in order
to maximize their individual energy efficiency. Interestingly,
it was shown that, under some assumptions, introducing a
certain degree of hierarchy in a multi-carrier system results in
a coordination game where the user with the higher priority
(i.e., the leader) and the user with the lower priority (i.e., the
follower) have incentive to choose their transmitting carriers in
such a way that they always transmit on orthogonal channels.
CONTRIBUTIONS
More specifically, we propose two nearly-optimal though
low complex algorithms to achieve spectrum coordination at
the equilibrium of the hierarchical game, namely:
• The δ-Optimal Complete Spectrum Coordination Algo-
rithm (δ-OCSC Algorithm) where hierarchy is introduced
exogenously, e.g., through the order of joining the net-
work,
• The δ-Modified Complete Spectrum Coordination Algo-
rithm (δ-MCSC Algorithm) where hierarchy is introduced
to minimize the distance from the equilibrium based on
already known channel gains.
The main rationale behind the proposed algorithms is that
if each entering player maximizes his payoff using all the
carriers, he may (and often will) degrade the utility of the
players before him. Assuming, that each player chooses only
from the carriers left idle by his predecessors, we obtain a
number of profits:
• no utility degradation by the players joining the game
later. In other words, the players profit from being leaders,
and thus will not change their decisions after others will
join the game,
• each player knows his final utility when he makes his
decision. He does not need to know neither how many
players will come after him, nor their channel quality.
Under this setting, for a large number of players, instead
of using a complicated, and not necessarily convergent
algorithms like the one of Meshkati et al. [6], it is reasonable
to use the proposed fast and simple algorithms, as in a vast
majority of cases it also gives an exact equilibrium solution.
These outcomes are meaningful to many practical scenarios.
Indeed, it is easy to see that this hierarchy concept can be
directly applied to any network in which users access to
the medium in an asynchronous manner by employing a
listen-before-talk mechanism such as cognitive radio networks
(with the primary user as the leader and secondary users
as followers). This is also a natural setting for (multi-tier)
heterogeneous wireless networks due to the absence of
coordination among the small cells, and between small cells
and macro cells [20], [21].
In the light of the above, the paper is structured as follows.
The general system model is provided in Sec. II-A. Sec. II-B
defines the energy efficiency framework and Sec. III presents
the game theoretic formulation. Then, in Sec. IV, we present
the two proposed algorithms to achieve complete spectrum
coordination at the equilibrium. Sec. V provide numerical
results to illustrate and validate the theoretical results derived
in the previous sections. Additional comments and conclusions
are provided in Sec. VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System Model and Notations
Consider a decentralized multiple access channel with an
arbitrary number of users N enjoying a slotted bandwidth of K
carriers. We assume that the system has N levels of hierarchy,
i.e., one user per level as follows: the super leader (player with
the highest priority) is assigned with level index 1, and the last
follower (player with the lowest priority) is assigned with level
index N . Accordingly, interference experienced by user n for
n = {2, . . . , N} results from the upper levels’ transmissions,
i.e., users m ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. It follows then that, for any
user n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the received SINR is expressed as
γkn =
gknp
k
n
σ2 +
n−1∑
m=1
gkmp
k
m
:= pknĥ
k
n (1)
We will call ĥkn the effective channel gain defined as the
ratio between the SINR and the transmission power for the
users over the kth carrier. gkn and p
k
n are resp. the fading
channel gain and the power control of user n transmitting
on carrier k, whereas σ2 is the variance of Gaussian noise.
For realistic reasons and since we try to obtain a complete
spectrum coordination, we will further assume that K ≥ N .
B. Network energy efficiency analysis
Our system model is based on the seminal paper [9] that
defines the energy efficiency framework. To pose the power
control problem as a game, we first need to define a utility
function suitable for data applications. SINR is a critical
parameter for the QoS of the signal transmission, as it directly
determines the bit error rate, which is closely related to the
data throughput (average rate of successful packet delivery). In
brief, when SINR is very low, data transmission results in mas-
sive errors and the throughput tends to 0; when SINR is very
high, data transmission becomes error-free and the throughput
grows asymptotically to a constant. However, achieving a
high SINR level requires the user terminal to transmit at a
high power, which in turn results in low battery life. This
phenomenon can be concisely captured by an increasing,
continuous and S-shaped ”efficiency” function f(·), which
measures the packet success rate. Therefore, the throughput
of user n over carrier k can be expressed as
Tn = Rn · f(γkn) (2)
where Rn stands for the transmission rate of user n and γkn
stands for the transmission rate and the SINR of user n over
carrier k. We also require that to ensure that the utility is equal
to 0 when pn = 0. On the other hand, increasing the transmit
power clearly favors the packet success rate and therefore
the throughput. However, as the packet success rate tends to
one, further increasing the power can lead to marginal gains
in terms of throughput regarding the amount of extra power
used. The following utility function allows one to measure the
corresponding trade-off between the transmission benefit (total
throughput over the K carriers) and cost (total power over the
K carriers):
un(p1, . . . ,pn) =
Rn ·
K∑
k=1
f(γkn)
K∑
k=1
pkn
(3)
where pn is the power control vector of user n over all
carriers, i.e., pn = (p1n, . . . , p
K
n ). The utility function un
that has bits per joule as units perfectly captures the trade-
off between throughput and battery life and is particularly
suitable for applications where energy efficiency is crucial. It
should be noted that the throughput in (2) could be replaced
with any increasing concave function as long as we make
sure that un(0, . . . , 0) = 0. It can be shown that, for a
sigmoidal efficiency function, the utility function in (3) is a
quasi-concave function of the user’s transmit power [22], and
we will use this assumption throughout our paper. This is also
true if the throughput in (2) is replaced with an increasing
concave function of γkn.
III. THE MULTI-LEVEL GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
We consider a multi-level game framework in which the
leader (referred to hereafter as user 1) decides first his power
control vector p1 and based on this value, the followers (re-
ferred to hereafter as user n for n = 2, . . . , N ) will adapt their
power control vectors pn in a sequential way depending on
their level of hierarchy according to the following optimization
problem
pkn(p1, . . . ,pn) = argmax
pn
un(p1, . . . ,pn) (4)
To characterize the solution of the above problem in a
multi-level system, we shall first look at the last follower
(user N ) who makes the first move to decide his transmit
power. An equilibrium can thus be determined using a multi-
level approach, where, given the action of higher users in
the hierarchy, we compute the best-response function of the
follower (the function pn(·) for n = 2, . . . , N ) and find the
actions of the followers which maximize their utilities. We
characterize this best-response function by using a result from
[6].
This result comes directly from Proposition 1 of [6] which
we adapt for the multi-level hierarchical game.
Proposition 1. Given the power control vector p1, . . . ,pn−1
of the first n−1 players in the hierarchy, the best-response of
the player n (for n ∈ {2, . . . , N}) is given by
pkn =
 γ
∗(σ2 +
∑n−1
m=1 g
k
mp
k
m)
gkn
, for k = Ln(p1, . . . ,pn−1),
0, for all k 6= Ln(p1, . . . ,pn−1)
(5)
with Ln(p1, . . . ,pn−1) = argmax
k
ĥkn(p1, . . . ,pn−1) and γ
∗
is the unique (positive) solution of the first order equation
x f ′(x) = f(x). (6)
Equation (6) has a unique solution if the efficiency
function f(·) is sigmoidal [22]. The last proposition says
that the best-response of the follower is to use only one
carrier, the one such that the effective channel gain is the best.
One could wonder why not let each player choose its power
allocation strategy according to Proposition 1? The response
is that, if a user had all the data, in order to profit from being
the leader in that case, he would have to make very complex
computations, whose complexity would grow exponentially
with the number of remaining players. To overcome these
computational challenges among others, we present, in the
next section, two simple nearly-optimal algorithms to obtain
complete spectrum coordination among users.
IV. PROPOSED SPECTRUM COORDINATION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we will show that using a simple procedure
combined with a well chosen hierarchy among the players, we
may obtain both a complete spectrum coordination and payoffs
not far from the optimum for each of the players. This can be
achieved in two different scenarios. In a way, considering a
centralized mode where the proposed system would require in-
formation from a third party (i.e., central database maintained
by regulator or another authorized entity) to schedule users
coming. In another way, an extra signaling channel is dedicated
to perform the collision detection so that users will not transmit
at the same moment. Such an assumption could be justified by
the fact that in an asynchronous context, the probability that
two users decide to transmit at the same moment is negligible
as the number of users is limited.
We start by defining a naive mechanism1 for determining
the power control for all the players. Let pi be an arbitrary
ordering (permutation) of the players.
Algorithm 1. pi-Complete Spectrum Coordination Algorithm
(pi-CSC Algorithm)
For n = 1, . . . , N do the following steps:
1) For player pi(n), choose the carrier with the highest
gkpi(n) that is not already chosen by some other player.
Denote it by κ(n).
2) Choose the following power control for player pi(n):
pkpi(n) =
{
γ∗σ2
gk
pi(n)
, when k = κ(n)
0, otherwise
The proposition below gives some important features of this
algorithm. To present it, we need to introduce some additional
notations. For each player n and every carrier k define ρkn =
gkn
gBnn
where Bn is the best channel for player n. This fraction
can be interpreted as loss of quality ratio of player n from
choosing carrier k instead of his best carrier (note that if we
assume that each of the players uses different carrier, as we
do here, their optimal utilities on their chosen carriers will be
1As we will see later in the paper, Algorithm 1 is just a starting point for
Algorithms 2 – 4.
f(γ∗)gknRn
γ∗σ2 , which is proportional to g
k
n). Next for each n and
l = 1, . . . ,K let ρn(l) be the l-th biggest value of ρkn.
Proposition 2. If there exists an α such that, for n =
1, . . . , N , ρpi(n)(n) > α, then the pi-CSC Algorithm gives each
user the utility not smaller than α times the biggest utility that
he can obtain2.
The proof of Prop. 2 is given in Appendix A. Two imme-
diate consequences of this proposition are the following:
Corollary 1. If α satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 2,
then the power control defined by the pi-CSC Algorithm are a
1−α
α -equilibrium in our power control game.
Corollary 2. If α satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 2,
then the optimal solution of our game when they use power
control defined by the pi-CSC Algorithm, is not smaller than
α times the optimal solution at the social optimum.
As we can see, even this simple control mechanism pos-
sesses some useful characteristics. It can notably be applied
in case the hierarchy is introduced exogenously, such as in
asynchronous systems where the probability that two users
decide to transmit at the same moment is negligible, provided
that the number of users is limited.
A. The δ-Optimal Complete Spectrum Coordination Algorithm
(δ-OCSC Algorithm)
If we can impose hierarchy between the players in order
to improve the performance of the mechanism, we may use
the algorithm defined below. Its main goal will be to find the
hierarchy of the players pi minimizing α (and in consequence
giving the solution closest both to the equilibrium and the
social optimum in our game). A small value δ > 0 is the
parameter of the algorithm.
Algorithm 2. Start with α = 0, α = 1, α∗ = 0 and pi∗ =
[1 . . . N ].
Repeat the following steps until the procedure is interrupted
in point 1):
1) If α − α < δ or α > 11+γ∗ stop. Otherwise take α∗ =
α+α
2 and pi = 01×K .
2) For n = 1, . . . , N do the following steps:
Find the smallest ρn(l∗) such that ρn(l∗) ≥ α∗. If
pi(l∗) = 0 then put pi(l∗) = n. Otherwise, find the
biggest l < l∗ such that pi(l) = 0, and put pi(l) = n.
If pi(l) 6= 0 for every positive l < l∗ put α = α∗ and
return to point 1).
3) Put pi∗ = pi with all the zero elements removed, α = α∗
and return to point 1).
Now, we can state Algorithm 3.
2By the biggest utility a player can obtain we mean utility that he obtains
when all the players cooperate to maximize his utility. It bounds from above
both his utility at equilibrium and at the social optimum.
Algorithm 3. δ-Optimal Complete Spectrum Coordination
Algorithm (δ-OCSC Algorithm)
1) Compute the values of ρn(l).
2) Perform Algorithm 2 for δ and ρn(l).
3) If the output pi∗ = 0, put α∗ = 0 and pi∗ = [1 . . . N ].
Then for the output pi∗ perform pi∗-CSC Algorithm.
Given the interpretation of ρkn, the parameter α appearing
in algorithms above can be interpreted as the maximal loss
of utility for any player from not being the leader, that is
the worst-case3 ratio of utility of any of the players who do
not choose their carriers first to their utility if they were the
first ones to choose. The objective of Algorithm 2 is to find
the ordering of the players which minimizes this disutility. It
is done by putting on i-th coordinate of ordering pi a player
(his index), who has at least i good carriers to choose from
(by which we mean i carriers with utility better than α times
his best possible utility if he was a leader). α∗ obtained by
Algorithm 2 is the minimum value for which such an ordering
is possible. As a consequence, the outcome of the δ-OCSC
Algorithm will have several useful properties.
Proposition 3. The choice of power control done by the δ-
OCSC Algorithm satisfy the following:
1) It gives each of the players the utility not smaller than
α∗ times the biggest utility that he can obtain.
2) It is a 1−α
∗
α∗ -equilibrium in the game.
3) The optimal solution in our game when they use power
control defined by it is not smaller than α∗ times the
optimal solution at the social optimum.
4) If α∗ > 11+γ∗ then the power control given by the
outcome of the algorithm is an equilibrium of the game.
Moreover, for δ small enough there exist the values g˜kn giving
the same values of ρn(l) as gkn such that the power control
obtained by the δ-OCSC Algorithm for the game with channel
gains equal to g˜kn are the best -equilibrium with complete
spectrum coordination.
The proof of Prop. 3 is given in Appendix B. We need to
know that Proposition 3 does not give exact information about
the quality of the algorithm proposed, just an upper bound
which may be far from exact. Especially, when N  K, the
bounds on the quality of the solution obtained can be far
from reality. In fact, the solution obtained then may either
be an equilibrium (or very close to it, even if α∗ is smaller
than 11+γ∗ ) or almost
1−α∗
α∗ away from equilibrium, even
though there exists one in the game. Anyway, as the last part
of the proposition states, the δ-OCSC Algorithm is the best
algorithm for choosing the power control of the players, in a
certain class. This class consists of the algorithms inducing
complete spectrum coordination, and such that the ordering of
the players is completely done before the power control starts.
3Worst-case here means that such a big disutility will only be perceived
by the players if their private ordering (from best to worst) of the carriers is
similar, e.g. when channel gains for different users are strongly correlated.
Remark 1. It is worth noting here that, in case N  K, a
simpler algorithm may give comparable expected utilities to
players: instead of finding optimal ordering of the players, we
may randomize it. This approach has however two important
disadvantages. First, even when N is small in comparison
to K, with some small probability a very bad ordering may
be obtained, which is not possible in δ-OCSC Algorithm.
Second, in general it may happen (and the probability of
such a situation grows as N approaches K) that the output
of Algorithm 3 will be optimal in any meaningful sense,
while randomization of the ordering of the players followed
by Algorithm 1 will give with probability close to 1 utility
close to 0 for some players. An example of such situation is
the following: let
gkn =
{
1− kε, k ≤ n,
(K − k)ε, k > n
for some small value of ε > 0. The optimal ordering of the
players here is 1, 2, . . . , n, with power allocations chosen by
the δ-OCSC Algorithm giving each of the players not less
than 1 − nε times his maximum utility. On the other hand,
when K = N , any other ordering will give at least one player
no more than Kε times his maximum utility, which can be
arbitrarily small for appropriately chosen ε. We will further
discuss this issue in Section V by comparing our approach to
a random coordination algorithm.
B. The δ-Modified Complete Spectrum Coordination Algo-
rithm (δ-MCSC Algorithm)
To go further with the analysis, and with the same goal of
obtaining a better energy efficiency at the equilibrium, we will
need an algorithm which updates the ordering of the players
after each power control is made. Such a modification should
be most effective exactly in case N  K, when most of the
desired power control (that is, the ones giving the players the
highest utilities possible) will not interfere with each other, as
δ-OCSC Algorithm tries to provide the best ordering in case
most of the desired choices do interfere. The pseudo-code for
the proposed approach is given in the next algorithm.
Algorithm 4. δ-Modified Complete Spectrum Coordination
Algorithm (δ-MCSC Algorithm)
Compute the values of ρkn. Define the sets of indices S =
{1, . . . , N} and S˜ = {1, . . . ,K}. For n = 1, . . . , N do the
following steps:
1) For the set of players reduced to S and set of carriers
reduced to S˜ update ρn(l)4 and perform Algorithm 2
for δ and ρn(l).
2) For the output pi∗(1) choose the carrier k ∈ S˜ with the
highest gkpi∗(1). Denote it by κ.
4But without updating the values of ρkn, just reducing the sets of indices
n and k.
3) Choose the following power control for player pi∗(1):
pkpi∗(1) =
{
γ∗σ2
gk
pi∗(1)
when k = κ
0 otherwise
4) Change the sets S and S˜ according to: S := S\{pi∗(1)},
S˜ := S˜ \ {κ}.
In fact, hierarchy between decisions players can be
introduced here in order to minimize the gap between the
output of the proposed algorithms and the equilibrium (based
on already known channel gains). We do not present any
formal proposition on the quality of the solution obtained,
as all the results of the Proposition 3 still hold for this
modification of the algorithm, while in general no better
boundaries can be obtained, as the differences between the
two algorithms depend strongly on the relation between N
and K.
Remark 2. Being higher in hierarchy is, unlike [23], profitable
for the players. It is straightforward to see that in Algorithm 1 a
player higher in hierarchy has more options to choose from, so
he can never lose on it. On the other hand, in Algorithms 3 and
4 the hierarchy is chosen to get solution of the game as close
to the equilibrium as possible. Consequently, if one of these
algorithms finds an exact equilibrium (we will see in the next
section that, for the vast majority of cases, we obtain an exact
equilibrium solution) a player trying to violate the ordering
introduced by the algorithm by going up the hierarchy may
lose on it, as this may move the game out of the equilibrium,
and responses of other players may degrade the deviator’s
performance.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider the widely used energy efficiency function in
power control games, that is f(x) = (1 − e−x)M , where
M = 100 is the block length in bits. For this efficiency
function, γ∗ ' 6.47 (or 8.1 dB). Note that we have sim-
ulated 10000 scenarios to remove the random effects from
the Rayleigh fading channels gkn. We have considered that
SNR = 1σ2 and that the rate of each user n is Rn = 1
Mbps. Unless otherwise stated, we fix the number of carriers
K to the number of users N .
Figure 2 depicts the probability that α >= 1/(1 + γ∗)
which, as part 4) of Proposition 3 claims, guarantees that the
power control given by the outcome of the algorithm δ-OCSC
is an exact equilibrium. Interestingly, although it is an ap-
proximate algorithm, with 98%, the δ-OCSC Algorithm finds
the value of an exact equilibrium, and not an -equilibrium.
This is not unexpected, as by part 4) of Proposition 3, already
the value of α∗ = 11+γ∗ (which in our case equals to 0.13)
implies that. It is important however to note that this result
suggests that, for a big number of players, it is reasonable to
use the proposed fast and simple algorithm instead of using
a complicated, and not necessarily convergent algorithms like
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the one of Meshkati et al. [6], as in a vast majority of cases
it gives an exact equilibrium solution.
We plot in Figure 3 the value of α∗ for the δ-MCSC
Algorithm as a function of iterations for a number of users
N = 10. Obviously, the first value obtained in Fig. 3 is the
one corresponding to the δ-OCSC Algorithm. As expected,
we observe that the value of α∗ increases as the number of
iterations increases. Note however, that this increase does not
usually imply the increase of energy efficiency as we will see
next in Fig. 4. But, as we can see in Fig. 3, also in this case,
for K = 12 carriers, we observe a significant increase of α∗
from the 6th iteration on, which can result in the δ-MCSC
Algorithm outperforming the δ-OCSC Algorithm.
Let us now illustrate the impact of such parameters on
the system performances at the equilibrium. Figure 4 depicts
the average energy efficiency when users implement the δ-
OCSC Algorithm and the δ-MCSC Algorithm for SNR = 10
dB, where the average is done over the N users. For our
comparison purpose, we exemplify our general analysis by
investigating the following algorithms:
• the random coordination algorithm: which uses a ran-
dom permutation of users and then applies Algorithm 1,
• the spectrum pooling algorithm: which is throughput-
based-utility [24], and
• the optimal solution: obtained through exhaustive search.
We vary the number of players from 2 (i.e., one leader and
one follower) to 30 (i.e., one leader and 29 followers). We first
observe that, for both δ-OCSC and δ-MCSC algorithms, the
energy efficiency increases with the number of users, which
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Fig. 4. Average energy efficiency at the equilibrium for increasing number
of users for SNR = 10 dB.
is somewhat intuitive, as a bigger number of players means
that more of them will be able to use their best carriers
due to channel diversity gain. Another important result is
that the two proposed algorithms perform very closely to
the optimal solution, which offer hope that our algorithms
perform reasonably well trying to make up for the decreasing
carrier diversity by using the player diversity instead. Such
a result is even more important, as the complexity of the
two proposed algorithms is in the worst case quadratic in the
number of users N , whereas the complexity of the exhaustive
search is N !. Moreover, it is clearly shown that the δ-OCSC
and δ-MCSC algorithms outperform the random coordination
algorithm as already stated by Remark 1. Finally, we remark
that the energy efficiency of the spectrum pooling algorithm
decreases as the number of users increases which suggests that
throughput-based-utility schemes are even less energy efficient
as the number of users increases, because in such case, users
have to transmit at higher power as the opportunity to transmit
is lower.
In Figure 5, we plot the average energy efficiency at the
equilibrium depending on the SNR for N = 5 users. Again, we
observe that the δ-OCSC and δ-MCSC algorithms outperform
the random coordination algorithm, and the gap between the
two proposed algorithms and the optimal solution is very small
even when the SNR increases. Here, the δ-MCSC algorithm
performs slightly better than the δ-MCSC algorithm. As the
SNR decreases, all configurations tend towards having the
same (zero) energy efficiency. This can be justified by the fact
that, at low SNR regime, whatever the power control strategy
each user chooses, the signal is overwhelmed by the noise.
In order to figure out the balance between the achievable
rate and energy consumption of the system, we plot in Fig. 6
the spectral efficiency as a function of the energy efficiency.
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the δ-OCSC and δ-
MCSC algorithms optimize the energy efficiency while still
maximizing the spectral efficiency, whereas the spectrum
pooling scheme performs slightly better in terms of spectral
efficiency, but is clearly energy inefficient with the respect
to the other schemes. Moreover, the spectral efficiency at the
equilibrium of the two proposed algorithms can be computed
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Fig. 5. Average energy efficiency at the equilibrium as a function of the
SNR for N = 5 users.
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Fig. 6. Spectral efficiency – Energy efficiency trade-off.
exactly: It is equal to log2(1 + γ
∗) ' 2.9, with γ∗ = 6.47,
which corresponds exactly to the spectral efficiency in Figure
6. Notice that this contrasts with most related works so far in
which the optimal energy efficiency performance often leads
to low spectral efficiency performance and vice versa [25]–
[30]. This key features have a great impact on the network
performance, and may further guide the design of power
control strategies in a multi-carrier energy efficient systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
The potential spectral efficiency gain along with the re-
duced computational complexity make spectrum coordination
across multiple interfering users much more challenging than
traditional setups built on strict interference avoidance. In
this work, we have considered a hierarchical multiple access
multi-carrier system in which users wish to selfishly maximize
their energy efficiency by means of adequately choosing their
power control policy over the carriers. A main challenge of
applying the idea of hierarchical games in the energy efficient
multi-carrier context is that, contrary to throughput-based-
utility problems where only a certain number of carriers are
exploited depending on the channel gains, energy efficient
systems always leave K − 1 bands completely vacant for
other users to be exploited. Following the above trend, we
have explored a multi-level (hierarchical) energy efficient
game framework where all players attempt to coordinate their
transmission (in terms of spectrum) and analyze how users
behave in the presence of hierarchy. The proposed approach
goes toward the vision of a fully coordinated multi-carrier
energy efficient wireless network, whereby transmit powers
are coordinated across the users. We have presented two
intuitive, easy to implement and nearly-optimal algorithms
which, in 98% of cases, converge to an exact equilibrium.
Interestingly, our simulation results have shown that the two
proposed algorithms achieve a flexible and desirable trade-off
between energy efficiency and throughput maximization by
exploiting the advantageous intrinsic features of the spectrum
coordination paradigm.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: First note that when each of the players uses
different carrier, player n choosing carrier k may at most
obtain utility g
k
n
σ2 , which is achieved by allocating power
pkn =
γ∗σ2
gkn
to this carrier. If at least two players allocate some
power to the same carrier k, the utility of each of them can
only decrease, thus the highest utility obtainable in the game
for player n (if all others cooperate to maximize his utility) is
maxk≤K
gkn
σ2 .
Now suppose that there exists α such that ρpi(n)(n) > α for
n = 1, . . . , N . Then at step j of the pi-CSC Algorithm user
pi(j) chooses one of the carriers that are not chosen yet. As
there are only j − 1 carriers already chosen, he will choose
one of j carriers, whose gkpi(j) are the greatest. For each of
them
gkpi(j) ≥ ρpi(j)(j)max
k≤K
gkpi(j) > αmax
k≤K
gkpi(j).
The utility obtained by pi(j) when he will allocate power
pkpi(j) =
γ∗σ2
gk
pi(j)
to such a k will thus be
gkpi(j)
σ2
> αmax
k≤K
gkpi(j)
σ2
,
which is α times the biggest utility obtainable for player pi(j)
in the game.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: First note that if Algorithm 2 does not give an
output (α∗, pi∗) with pi∗ 6= 0, we can take α∗ = 0 and pi∗ =
(1, 2, . . . , N). This is because for α∗ = 0 every ρn(l) will be
bigger than α∗. Thus any ordering of the players pi∗ will satisfy
ρpi∗(l)(l) ≥ α∗ for every l = 1, . . . , N and by Proposition 2
and Corollaries 1 and 2 also statements 1), 2) and 3) of the
proposition.
Next, see also that Algorithm 2 is always terminated at
some step, as after each passage through points 1)–3) of the
algorithm, α−α decreases twice, thus at most after log2(δ−1)
passages, α− α < δ, which stops the algorithm.
Now suppose that α∗ and pi∗ are nonzero outputs of
Algorithm 2. Then for every l = 1, . . . , N , ρpi∗(l)(l) ≥ α∗,
as by construction of pi∗, for each l∗ chosen in the algorithm,
α∗ ≤ ρpi∗(l)(l∗) ≤ ρpi∗(l)(l), where the last inequality is due to
the facts that l ≤ l∗ and that ρn(l) are decreasing in l. Again,
we can apply Proposition 2 and Corollaries 1 and 2 to obtain
statements 1), 2) and 3) of the proposition also in this case.
Now suppose that the first part of the δ-OCSC Algorithm
(Algorithm 2) was terminated by condition (α∗ =)α > 11+γ∗ ,
and let (p1, p2, . . . , pN ) be the power control vector chosen
in the second part of the algorithm. We will show that these
controls form an equilibrium in the game. Suppose they do
not, that is – there exists a player n who can gain by deviating
form it. First note that he will not deviate to any of the carriers
that are not used by anyone, as pi∗-CSC algorithm assures that
player n always chooses his best available carrier at the time
decision is made. Obviously the set of unoccupied carriers
may only shrink afterwards, so any carrier that is idle upon
the termination of the algorithm can only decrease the utility
for player n. Thus suppose that player n changes his carrier
to some carrier k∗, used by some other player j using power
pk
∗
j =
γ∗σ2
gk
∗
j
. By Proposition 1 (adapted to the N -player case)
the biggest utility for player n that can be obtained on that
carrier will be for power
pk
∗
n =
γ∗(σ2 + gk
∗
j p
k∗
j )
gk∗n
=
γ∗(σ2 + gk
∗
j
γ∗σ2
gk
∗
j
)
gk∗n
=
γ∗σ2(1 + γ∗)
gk∗n
. (7)
This utility will be thus equal to
γ∗
pk∗n
=
gk
∗
n
γ∗σ2(1 + γ∗)
.
On the other hand the utility obtained by i on carrier κ(n)
he currently uses is g
κ(n)
n
γ∗σ2 and by already proved part 1) of
Proposition 3 not worse than
α∗max
k≤K
gkn
γ∗σ2
> max
k≤K
gkn
γ∗(1 + γ∗)σ2
≥ g
k∗
n
γ∗σ2(1 + γ∗)
,
which ends the proof of part 4) of the proposition.
Finally let g˜kn be defined by
g˜kn = ρn(k)max
l≤K
gln.
Obviously g˜kn give the same values of ρn(k) as g
k
n. Note also
that, for each of the players, the biggest value of g˜kn is for
k = 1, the second biggest for k = 2 and so on. Thus, for such
g˜kn,
ρkn = ρn(k). (8)
Obviously, for such values of g˜kn, each of the players will
always be better off choosing one of the carriers 1, . . . , N
than any other ones. Thus we can assume that in our problem
N = K. Now suppose that, for some δ > 0, there exists a
power control in the game, inducing spectrum coordination
and such that each of the players receives more than (α∗ +
δ)maxk≤K
gkn
γ∗σ2 , which is α
∗ + δ times the biggest possible
value of his utility (where α∗ is obtained in Algorithm 2 for
δ). Let k∗(n) be the carrier chosen by player n in that control.
Since by 1) of Proposition 3 it could not be found by the δ-
OCSC Algorithm, no ordering of the players pi can be found
such that
ρpi(n)(n) ≥ α∗ + δ (9)
for every n = 1, . . . , N . Let us take pi such that k∗(pi(n)) =
n for n = 1, . . . , N (since K = N and we have spectrum
coordination, this is well defined). Let i∗ denote i for which
(9) is not satisfied. For such an i∗ we have
g
k∗(pi(i∗))
pi(i∗)
maxk≤K gkpi(i∗)
= ρ
k∗(pi(i∗))
pi(i∗) ,
which by (8) equals
ρpi(i∗)(k
∗(pi(i∗))) = ρpi(i∗)(i∗) < α∗ + δ
and thus there exists a player j = pi(i∗) such that
g
k∗(j)
j < (α
∗ + δ)max
k≤K
gkj
which implies that his utility is
g
k∗(j)
j
γ∗σ2
< (α∗ + δ)max
k≤K
gkj
γ∗σ2
,
contradicting the assumption that each of the players receives
more than (α∗ + δ)maxk≤K
gkn
γ∗σ2 .
